Having not followed the Casey Anthony trial, I'm at something at a disadvantage offering posts on the case. But Richard Underwood at Legal Ethics Forum ("Is Jose Hosed?") says there's a professional ethics angle opening up by a number of civil suits that have now been brought against Anthony, so perhaps this will interest those of you who followed the case. Here goes.
Casey Anthony initially explained her two-year-old daughter Caylee's disappearance by claiming that she'd been kidnapped by a babysitter. At trial, Anthony's attorney said that statement was a lie -- that Caylee had accidentally drowned. Three civil suits have been filed since Anthony's acquittal on charges of murdering her daughter -- one by a local babysitter with a name similar to the name of the fictitious babysitter Anthony fingered as a suspect; one by a Texas group that searched for Caylee; and one by a diver who volunteered his services to search. The question is whether Anthony will be held accountable in the civil litigation for her attorney's statement that her story about the babysitter and the missing toddler that precipitated the searches was a lie. Further, Anthony is appealing her conviction on four counts of lying to law enforcement; what is the implication of her attorney's statements for those appeals?
Underwood points to a 1984 federal case, U.S. v McKeon, in which a criminal defense lawyer's statements bound his client in a retrial as admissions, precluding a change in his theory of the case. Assuming that the court in a civil case would admit her attorney's opening statements in the murder trials, Underwood says that Anthony might argue that the attorney just made the stuff up, and then, what would the lawyer say? Which brings us around to the relevance to these facts of Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4(c), which says that a lawyer shall not:
(e) during trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence, assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an accused; or
(f) request a person other than a client to refrain from voluntarily giving relevant information to another party unless:
(1) the person is a relative or an employee or other agent of a client; and
(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the person's interests will not be adversely affected by refraining from giving such information.
This feels like pretty uncharted territory, beyond the familiar markers of res judicata and collateral estoppel and issue preclusion. Civil suits over the costs associated with a search or the libelous nature of shifting blame to a phantom babysitter with name similarity to the plaintiff are not the same thing as a retrial of the criminal case. The suggestion that language in opening statement or closing argument in a criminal case could have the same effect as contentions in a civil pleading on subsequent advocacy would likely take the criminal defense bar aback.
NYU's Stephen Gillers (winner of the ABA's 2011 Michael Franck Professional Responsibility Award) makes the point on Legal Ethics Forum:
Isn't the reality that this sort of thing simply cannot be policed, at least not in a criminal case? A lawyer may plan to prove fact X and mention it in an opening, but later does not, perhaps for strategic reasons, or so he will claim. In a criminal case, at least, an inquiry into whether the lawyer had a good faith basis for believing he had evidence of fact X would seem problematic. Another check is that the opposing lawyer can emphasize that the first lawyer did not carry through on the promise in his opening.