According to Legal Ethics Forum (LEF), there's the makings of an uproar going on up north over a retired Canadian Supreme Court justice offering a legal opinion on the meaning of two opinions in which he was involved as a justice. The issue on which he is opining on behalf of the Canadian Bar Association (and in opposition to the Federation of Law Societies) happens to be lawyer ethics in Canada, but his involvement raises another ethical issue: whether he should be rendering a "legal opinion" from retirement commenting on the meaning of an opinion in which he participated. Here's an example of his commentary:
As you are aware, I sat in that case and sided with the Chief Justice. The differences of opinion between the majority and the minority are more important than noted by Professor Cotter. First, we, of the minority, were of the opinion that the majority wrongly refused to accept some findings of fact that were determinative of the extent and duration of the mandate of the law firm and of Mr Strother in particular. Second, we were not satisfied that the majority applied Neil correctly; in particular, we could not see how the majority could conclude in Neil that the duty of loyalty is that “of the firm” and find in Strother that the firm had not breached that duty because it had no knowledge of the personal interest of one of its partners. The main point of disagreement was of course the application of the fiduciary duties. We were of the view that those duties are not meant as an expansion of the mandate set out in the retainer; we thought that they cannot be used to impose a new implied retainer, but that they are there to define the obligations (explicit and implicit) in carrying out the terms of the retainer. If the retainer was truly finished, there was no duty to act for the former client and give advise on new tax provisions. There was nothing to correct regarding past advice based on different legal provisions. The majority itself accepted that Sentinel was not acting in any way adverse to the interests of Monarch. The personal interest of Strother in Sentinel was a business interest acquired after leaving his law firm and the business was new, in the sense that it responded by way of a new scheme to new tax regulations and was built upon an operational model developed by Paul Darc, not Strother.
A comment to the LEF suggests that retired American judges opining on the meaning of their opinions is no big deal:
[I]n the U.S., a retired judge (or sitting judge, for that matter) can talk until she is blue in the face about what she meant in an opinion, and the reaction would be either: (1) [the snarky version] if that's what you meant you should have written it more clearly, or (2) [the more sophisticated version] once you've issued an opinion it's no longer under your control, so to speak, but belongs to the interpretive community of the profession as a whole, who can use all of the tools at their disposal to affect its received meaning.
Really? While I don't doubt that the U.S. reaction would be precisely what the commenter suggests, I don't think that his hypothesis has really been tested. Readers, if you know of retired U.S. judges opining on opinions they've rendered or participated in for the purpose of influencing public policy on the issue, please chime in.