Faith in the facts about "shaken baby syndrome" has recently been shaken, but that didn't stop the U.S. Supreme Court from telling the 9th circuit that it overstepped its bounds in overturning a guilty verdict in California state court shaken baby case. From the per curiam (PDF):
In light of the evidence presented at trial, the Ninth Circuit plainly erred in concluding that the jury’s ver- dict was irrational, let alone that it was unreasonable for the California Court of Appeal to think otherwise. See §2254(d). Doubts about whether Smith is in fact guilty are understandable. But it is not the job of this Court, and was not that of the Ninth Circuit, to decide whether the State’s theory was correct. The jury decided that question, and its decision is supported by the record.
Jason Mazzone at Balkinization points out that the Court's decision was no surprise -- the Supreme Court had vacated the 9th circuit panel's decision twice before, pointedly drawing "the panel’s attention to this Court’s opinions highlighting the necessity of deference to state courts" on habeas review.
Be that as it may, Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Breyer and Sotomayor, dissented:
[T]his is a notably fact-bound case in which the Court of Appeals unquestionably stated the correct rule of law. It is thus “the type of case in which we are most inclined to deny certiorari.” Nevertheless, the Court is bent on rebuking the Ninth Circuit for what it conceives to be defiance of our prior remands. I would not ignore Smith’s plight and choose her case as a fit opportunity to teach the Ninth Circuit a lesson.
But even if granting review qualified as a proper exercise of our discretionary authority, I would resist summary reversal of the Court of Appeals’ decision. The fact intensive character of the case calls for attentive review of the record, including a trial transcript that runs over 1,500 pages. Careful inspection of the record would be aided by the adversarial presentation that full briefing and argument afford. Peremptory disposition, in my judgment, is all the more inappropriate given the grave consequences of upsetting the judgment below: Smith, who has already served ten years, will be returned to prison to complete a sentence of fifteen years to life. Before depriving Smith of the liberty she currently enjoys, and her family of her care, I would at least afford her a full opportunity to de fend her release from a decade’s incarceration. [citations removed]
